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Abstract The offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under s. 20 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 has been confirmed as the most
appropriate ground for convicting a reckless transmission of the HIV virus
through sexual intercourse.1 An informed consent from the victim, along
with a reasonable belief in that consent from the defendant, will now
suffice as a defence to such a charge.2 However, it remains unclear how
and when the victim must be informed of the relevant circumstances in
order to provide consent to infected intercourse, and it is also undecided
whether the defendant himself must divulge his HIV status in order to
claim an honest belief in the victim’s consent.3 Additionally, the fine line
of consensual activity drawn in R v Brown4 appears to have been eroded by
recent HIV transmission cases.5 This article outlines the development in
relation to s. 20 to include HIV offences; it aims to untangle the recent
authorities on knowledge, deception and consent in relation to both
victims and perpetrators in reckless HIV transmission cases and suggests a
way forward for the law in the shape of a new offence.
Keywords Sexual offences; HIV transmission; Intention; Informed
consent; Recklessness
The issue of informed consent in relation to sexual offences has been
discussed at length recently, highlighting the ambiguous nature of s. 74
of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A defendant’s deceptive state of mind
during the act of intercourse calls into question whether the victim’s
consent to sexual intercourse is properly informed. What if, on the
occasion that consent to intercourse is present from both parties, one
* Lecturer in Law, Bradford University School of Management; e-mail:
L.Cherkassky@Bradford.ac.uk.
1 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 at 1273, per Judge LJ. Subjective recklessness is
necessary for a s. 20 conviction, requiring the defendant to see that he may inflict
some bodily harm on the victim: see R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 and R v
Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421, affirmed by Lord Ackner in R v Savage and Parmenter
[1992] 1 AC 699 at 721.
2 R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at 208–9, per Judge LJ.
3 These quandaries arose from the decisions in R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 and R v
Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 14, both holding that knowledge leading to an
informed consent can come from any source, but if it is not from the defendant,
he cannot have an honest belief in that consent. See R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 at
1265–6 and R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at 208–9.
4 [1994] 1 AC 212.
5 Lord Lane CJ in Attorney-General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057 at
1060 stated that consent is irrelevant if actual bodily harm is intended and/or
caused. This distinction was brought into disrepute somewhat by the decision in
R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 allowing ‘victims’ to consent to a s. 20 offence.
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party harbours a different ‘intention’ or ‘need’ to the other party, who is
deceived on this matter?6 Could this vitiate consent? The answer in
relation to rape appears to be ‘no’, but the element of deception and the
phrase ‘informed consent’ both combine to cause particular difficulties
in HIV transmission cases, where the word ‘informed’ can constitute
many different actions, and where ‘deception’ does lead to prosecution
(albeit for malicious wounding).
This article will focus mainly on deception, knowledge and informed
consent in relation to the transmission of the HIV under s. 20 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, but a discussion outlining the
recent debates on informed consent in the field of sexual offences will be
addressed. The recent theory suggesting that a mistake as to fact can
vitiate consent holds an interesting connection to deceptive HIV cases.
When is consent ‘informed’ in sexual offences?
Removing the specific issue of HIV transmission from the equation for
the moment, consenting to sex is not as simple as it sounds. The offence
of rape in the UK places an emphasis on consent rather than force,
which, as Bohlander points out, leads to the impression that rape in the
UK does not require force or threats, leading to various other options
when vitiating consent.7 Section 74 of the 2003 Act states as follows:
For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and
has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
It is difficult to decipher what exactly Parliament meant by this simple
definition. The words ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ clearly relate to the use of
force, and ‘capacity’ is a reference to a person’s sound mind capable of
providing consent. Elliott and De Than argue that the real issue behind
s. 74 is whether a person has the freedom and capacity to agree, because
when a person is consenting to something, he is effectively agreeing to
it; whether or not he had a choice really does not matter.8 However,
‘freedom’ in s. 74 can also refer to the more contentious issue of
deception: we are not entirely ‘free’ to accept a ‘thing’ until we know
every relevant detail about that thing. Jonathan Herring was the first to
canvas this idea in detail in relation to rape. He put forward the follow-
ing provision:
If at the time of the sexual activity a person:
(i) is mistaken as to a fact; and
6 The most obvious example would be one person believing the intercourse to be a
sign of love and commitment, whereas the other person views the act as a one-
night stand with no further obligations.
7 Such as what we see today: misrepresentations and non-disclosure of facts. See
M. Bohlander, ‘Mistaken Consent to Sex, Political Correctness and Correct Policy’
(2007) 71 JCL 412.
8 C. Elliott and C. De Than, ‘The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in
Criminal Law’ (2007) 70 MLR 225 at 238–9, and see generally I. Dennis, ‘The
Sexual Offences Act’ [2004] Crim LR 79.
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(ii) had s/he known the truth about that fact would not have consented
to it,
then s/he did not consent to the sexual activity.9
The difficulties with this provision are clear. According to Herring, a
victim can be mistaken as to any ‘fact’, which will in turn invalidate her
consent to sex. The list of mistaken facts could be endless; anything from
the defendant’s age to his future intentions with the victim (or lack of
them) could be considered as mistaken facts and therefore grounds to
vitiate consent. In practice this is unworkable. Hyman Gross took a
practical approach to Herring’s proposal, reminding us that the act of sex
is still consented to, and that the immoral intentions of the defendant
were not to be placed on a elevated moral plane for us to judge and
punish.10 Herring’s proposal was also connected to instances where
intercourse was for a particular purpose, such as a display to the victim of
the defendant’s plans to share a future together. If the victim was being
deceived as to this purpose behind the act of intercourse, this deceptive
fact would be sufficient to vitiate the victim’s consent. This has been
described as disrespectful to sexually autonomous persons by Gross,
who does concede that s. 76 of the 2003 Act provides that the victim can
be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sexual act consented to,
but that it is the victim’s own prerogative to exercise scepticism when
being influenced by the defendant.11 Clearly, the chance that a defend-
ant can be deceptive as to his intentions with the victim, or his feelings
towards the victim, is causing an air of unrest to surround the ambigu-
ous s. 74. The provisions under s. 76 regarding ‘deception’, ‘nature’ and
‘purpose’ do not help, creating the notion that a victim can be deceived
about almost anything.
Even though Herring may have been considered by some writers to
be taking the element of informed consent too far, his ideas about
mistake and deception closely connect to the malicious transmission of
HIV. If a victim is deceived about this fact, consent is vitiated, but not as
to the act of intercourse, but to the offence of malicious wounding under
s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.12 All the recent case
law in this area suggests that in order to consent to contracting HIV, the
victim’s consent must be ‘informed’, and the defendant must have an
honest belief in such consent.13 It will be shown that the ‘informed
consent’ is currently the victim’s responsibility and can come in many
guises, and the defendant must simply believe that the victim has done
her research, leaving him to bear no responsibility as an ‘informant’ to
divulge his status.
9 See J. Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Crim LR 511 at 517.
10 H. Gross, ‘Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights’ [2007] Crim LR 220 at 225. Also
see Bohlander, above n. 7 at 416, who states: ‘Just because the humiliation in
Herring’s example happens mostly to women is not a sufficient reason to
criminalise it, and certainly not as rape’.
11 Gross, above n. 10 at 224.
12 R v EB [2007] 1 WLR 1567.
13 See especially R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 and R v EB [2007] 1 WLR 1567.
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The development of s. 20 to include HIV
Section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provides:
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous
bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or
instrument, shall be guilty of an offence . . .
The harm element of s. 20 is satisfied if all the layers of the skin are
broken,14 and the terms ‘wound’ and ‘grievous bodily harm’ can include
a wide range of injuries.15
In R v Clarence16 the interpretation of ‘inflict’ in s. 20 implied an
assault or a battery of which grievous bodily harm was the ‘direct,
immediate and obvious result’.17 The defendant had sexual intercourse
with his wife aware that he had gonorrhoea, although his wife had no
knowledge of this. Transmission of infection was held not to be included
within the s. 20 definition because there was deemed to be ‘a crucial
difference’ between an immediate and necessary connection of a cut or
a blow and the uncertain and delayed operation of an infection.18 The
House of Lords submitted that the consent would only be vitiated if it
was obtained by fraud as to either the nature of the act, or the identity
of the agent.19 In addition, the victim was found to have consented to
the infected act as intercourse during marriage in 1888 was assumed to
be consensual.20 The victim’s knowledge of transmission (or rather lack
of) was therefore irrelevant. The position was changed by R v Clarence-
Wilson,21 in which it was confirmed that notwithstanding the absence of
an assault, infliction of grievous bodily harm under s. 20 could be
committed:
grievous bodily harm may be inflicted where the accused has directly
inflicted it . . . or . . . where the accused has ‘inflicted’ it by doing something
intentionally which . . . is not in itself a direct application of force to the
body of the victim.22
This decision represented a major erosion of the authority of Clarence.
The developments continued in R v Chan-Fook23 where Lord Hobhouse
LJ held that an infection resulting from an assault was an internal injury
14 This was confirmed in Moriarty v Brooks (1834) 172 ER 1419 and R v M’Loughlin
(1838) 173 ER 651.
15 Grievous bodily harm is considered to be ‘really serious harm’ (see R v Metheram
[1961] 3 All ER 200) and the totality of injuries can be combined for the term
‘grievous’: R v Grundy [1977] Crim LR 543.
16 (1888) 22 QBD 23.
17 Ibid. at 41, per Stephen J. However, compare R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54, in
which an infliction of grievous bodily harm was upheld despite no direct battery.
18 (1888) 22 QBD 23 at 41 and 45. It was considered ‘contrary to common sense’
and ‘an abuse of language’ to describe Clarence’s infected intercourse as an
assault: see ibid. at 56, per Manisty J.
19 Ibid. at 44–5.
20 Described by Hawkins J in Clarence as an ‘irrevocable privilege’ until the balance
was redressed in R v R [1992] 1 AC 599.
21 [1984] AC 242.
22 Ibid. at 260, per Lord Roskill, approving the influential Australian decision of R v
Salisbury [1976] VR 452.
23 [1994] 1 WLR 689.
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sufficient to meet the definition under s. 20.24 Taking advantage of these
developments, R v Dica25 confirmed that the reckless transmission of HIV
did in fact constitute an offence under s. 20. The defendant, knowing he
was HIV positive, infected two women through intercourse. The women
were unaware of his HIV positive status. Judge LJ concluded:
If psychiatric injury can be inflicted without direct or indirect violence, for
the purposes of section 20 physical injury may be similarly inflicted. It is no
longer possible to discern the critical difference identified by the majority in
Clarence between an ‘immediate and necessary connection’ between the
relevant blow and the consequent injury, and the ‘uncertain and delayed’
effect of the act which led to the eventual development of infection.26
The uncertain and delayed development of infection was no longer
distinguished from an immediate and direct physical harm, and Clarence
was overruled.
When bodily harm occurs during sexual encounters, the rules regarding
consent have been strict. The Court of Criminal Appeal took a strict line
in R v Donovan27 where the defendant beat a 17-year-old girl with a cane
for sexual gratification:
As a general rule, it is an unlawful act to beat another person with such a
degree of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a probable con-
sequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial.28
Similarly, Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980)29 later held that it
was not in the public’s interest to allow people to ‘cause and/or intend to
cause’ each other bodily harm ‘for no good reason’.30 This dictum has
inevitably been described as ‘vague in the extreme’ by Giles,31 and
Ormerod submits that it goes too far, claiming that the use of the phrase
‘and/or’ implies that an act done to another with consent is an assault
even if harm is unintended or unforeseen.32 However, Lord Lane CJ’s
statement drew a very clear line. Any assault and/or battery which
24 Ibid. at 694, affirmed by R v Ireland and Burstow [1997] 4 All ER 225. Lord Hope in
Burstow described Clarence as a ‘troublesome authority’ and claimed that in the
context of ‘inflict’ Clarence ‘no longer assisted’ (at 235).
25 [2004] QB 1257.
26 Ibid. at 1266.
27 [1934] 2 KB 498.
28 Ibid. at 507, per Swift J. The harm ‘need not be permanent, but must . . . be more
than transient or trifling’. Exceptions listed (ibid. at 508–9) include wrestling,
rough and undisciplined sport or play, and the reasonable chastisement of a child.
29 [1981] 2 All ER 1057.
30 Ibid. at 1059–60, per Lord Lane CJ. In this case two men engaged in a quarrel in a
public street resulting in actual bodily harm. Violent sexual encounters probably
fall within the ambit of Lord Lane CJ’s ‘no good reason’, but good reasons—per
Swift J in R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498—included properly conducted games,
sports, and surgical intervention.
31 M. Giles, ‘R v Brown: Consensual Harm and the Public Interest’ (1994) 57 MLR
101 at 104–5.
32 See D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 9th edn
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 626. Interestingly, in R v Slingsby [1995]
Crim LR 570, Judge J ruled that simply because injury was ‘caused’ it was
contrary to principle to treat the consensual assault as criminal.
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either intends to cause harm and/or does cause harm crosses the line of
non-consensual activity.
The issues surrounding sexual consent and non-fatal offences were
analysed in detail in R v Brown.33 The appellants—a group of homo-
sexual sado-masochists—willingly and enthusiastically participated in
the commission of acts of violence against each other for sexual pleas-
ure. Consent was held to be a defence to non-sexual offences against
the person such as common law assault,34 but the difficult issue for the
House of Lords in Brown was whether the defence of consent could be
extended to cover the infliction of bodily harm in the course of homo-
sexual sado-masochistic encounters.35 The House of Lords ruled that
sado-masochistic practices were unpredictably dangerous, degrading,
violent, and injurious to individuals and harmful to society generally,36
and although public policy was probably the main reason behind the
Brown decision, it was apparent that the spread of diseases contributed to
the rationale.37 This makes the supposition that Brown only applies to
homosexual behaviour doubtful.
A fine line has been drawn between common law assault and s. 47 of
the 1861 Act. Consent is only a defence to the latter if the circumstances
fall into a well-known exception.38 This fine line, affirming Lord Lane
CJ’s dictum in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980), appears very
fragile. Might the difference between an assault and a trivial bodily harm
be too fine to be put to a jury?39
The application of Brown was narrowed considerably in the light of
R v Wilson,40 and both cases were distinguished despite very similar
facts.41 It was held not to be in the public’s interest to consider con-
sensual activity between a husband and wife as a matter for criminal
investigation.42 This decision has been contested by several comment-
ators, who argue that the rationale in Brown should be applied to all
33 [1994] 1 AC 212.
34 Defined by Robert Goff LJ in Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 377 as ‘an act
which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate unlawful
force on his person’.
35 Charges of both s. 47 and s. 20 of the 1861 Act arose in this case. Section 47
requires any assault or battery to occasion actual bodily harm: any hurt which is
more than transient or trifling—including bruising and abrasions—will suffice: see
R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 and T v DPP [2003] EWCA Crim 255. The mens rea
is that of the assault or battery which occasioned the harm: R v Savage and
Parmenter [1992] 94 Cr App R 193 at 207, per Lord Ackner.
36 These were the views of Lord Templeman [1994] 1 AC 212 at 235 and Lord
Jauncey ibid. at 246.
37 Lord Templeman pointed out that two members of the group had died from HIV
and one member had contracted the virus, and Lord Mustill noted the risk of
genito-urinary infection (see [1994] 1 AC 212 at 236 and 274).
38 These were listed by Lord Jauncey in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 as sports,
chastisement and surgery (at 244–5).
39 Ormerod believes juries regularly make this distinction: see Ormerod, above n. 32
at 693.
40 [1996] 2 Cr App R 241.
41 Wilson burned his wife’s flesh for sexual gratification and was charged under s. 47
of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
42 [1996] 2 Cr App R 241 at 243–4, per Russell LJ.
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harmful sexual activities.43 Surely this is correct? In R v Emmett44 a
heterosexual couple engaged in dangerous sexual activities leading to
haemorrhages, bruising, burns, and a charge under s. 47. The Court of
Appeal held that there was to be no distinction between sado-
masochistic activities in heterosexual and homosexual encounters, but
it is not clear just how seriously this decision has been taken. The
rationale behind Emmett was that the injuries sustained ‘crossed the line
of consent’ drawn in Brown, confirming that the line of consent in Brown
applies not just to homosexuals, but to all dangerous sexual exploits
which cause harm.45
Dica46 drew an interesting line regarding consent and HIV transmis-
sion. The defendant concealed his HIV status and transmitted the HIV
virus to two women. Dica was distinguished from the violent acts in
Brown on the basis that Dica and his partners were not intent on
spreading disease or indulging in serious violence for the purposes of
sexual gratification. They are simply prepared, knowingly, to run the
risk—not the certainty—of infection.47 From one view, it seems logical
that consensual acts of intercourse are not unlawful merely because
there may be a known risk to the health of a participant—people may
take risks. But from another view, the public policies (and the line of
consent) which were so central to Brown do not appear to be relevant to
the spread of the HIV virus. Judge LJ elaborated on the consent issue in
Konzani,48 in which the defendant, who knew of his HIV positive status,
had consensual intercourse with three unsuspecting women, all of
which contracted the HIV virus. Judge LJ declared that:
For the complainant's consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus to
provide a defence, her consent must be an informed consent. The conceal-
ment of [HIV] almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is
not properly informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to some-
thing of which she is ignorant . . . the defendant's honest belief must be
concomitant with the consent which provides a defence.49
It is logical that the defendant cannot hold a reasonable belief in
consent if he has not divulged his status. Weait comments that the
judgment in Konzani is a radical interpretation of recklessness going
beyond conscious, unjustifiable risk-taking and requiring an additional
element of non-disclosure.50 This certainly seems to be the case at first
43 See, in particular, Giles, above n. 31 at 106–7; C. Withey, ‘Biological GBH:
Overruling Clarence?’ (2003) 153 NLJ 1698 at 1701; P. Roberts, ‘Consent to Injury:
How Far Can You Go?’ (1997) 113 LQR 27 at 28, and M. Davies, ‘R v Dica: Lesson
in Practising Unsafe Sex’ (2004) 68 JCL 498 at 499.
44 R v Emmett, The Times (15 October 1999), CA.
45 Ibid., per Wright J, sourced by Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): All England
Official Transcripts provided by Lexisnexis.com (Butterworths). 
46 [2004] QB 1257.
47 Ibid. at 1270, per Judge LJ. The intentional transmission of the HIV virus is
considered to be an offence under s. 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861: see R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at 207, per Judge LJ.
48 [2005] 2 Cr App R 198.
49 Ibid. at 208–9. Consent also involves knowing the implications of HIV infection.
50 M. Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68
MLR 121, at 127.
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glance, but it transpires further on in the judgment that the ‘victim’ may
still provide informed consent despite the defendant’s non-disclosure.51
How? Brown, Dica and Konzani raise difficult questions regarding consent
and knowledge. How valid is the victim’s consent to a s. 20 harm, and
what elements are required to make that consent informed and
believable?
Transmitting HIV and the law of consent
Malicious wounding under s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act
1861 is not normally open to consent. The HIV virus has been placed
under the ambit of s. 20 because of its seriousness, and thus the law
regarding consent has been warped to fit around this development.
These difficulties can be traced back to Brown. Brown has been criticised
for being paternalistic and confusing,52 temporarily placing the law of
consent in a difficult quandary in relation to transmission of infection.
Any conduct causing actual bodily harm for a purpose which did not fall
under one of Lord Jauncey’s exceptions was considered a hostile appli-
cation of force and thus over the consensual threshold.53 In the 10 years
between Brown in 1994 and Dica in 2004, non-infected long-term part-
ners of HIV carriers could not consent to unprotected sex: any unpro-
tected intercourse which did take place would thus have been rape.54
This was a highly objectionable outcome, and has been described as
‘distasteful’ and ‘startling’.55 For the foreseeable future, R v EB estab-
lishes that whilst the transmission of disease is not consented to, the act
of sexual intercourse still is, and thus no rape charge will incur. Latham
LJ held that where one party to sexual activity has a sexually transmis-
sible disease which is not disclosed to the other party, any consent that
may have been given to that activity by the recipient is not thereby
vitiated. The act of intercourse remains a consensual act.56 This prevents
any chance of s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—and Herring’s
‘mistaken sex’ theory—wading into the mire to contend that if a victim
is mistaken as to the nature, purpose, or a fact regarding sexual inter-
course, consent to that intercourse is vitiated. Temkin and Ashworth
51 R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at 208–9, per Judge LJ (further below).
52 According to Bamforth, Brown was ‘based on an undesirable misconception’: see
M. Bamforth, ‘Sado-masochism and Consent’ (1994) Crim LR 661 at 664.
53 In Brown the House of Lords confirmed that a battery must consist of ‘hostile’
contact, which supposedly illustrates the intentions and attitudes of the defendant
([1994] 1 AC 212 at 260–1, per Lord Mustill).
54 Under s. 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ‘A’ commits rape if (a) he
intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of ‘B’ with his penis, (b) B
does not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B
consents.
55 See D. Warburton, ‘A Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising
Blameworthy Behaviour by HIV+ Individuals’ (2004) 68 JCL 55 at 64 and R v
Tabassum [2000] Crim LR 686 at 688, commentary by Professor Sir J. C. Smith.
See also Davies, above n. 43 at 504; J. Herring, above n. 9 at 520–3, and R.
Williams, ‘Deception, Mistake and Vitiation of the Victim’s Consent’ (2008) LQR
132 at 149. Judge LJ in R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 did make a passing comment
that it would not be considered rape if an individual was deceived into intercourse
with an infected partner, but no further comment was given (at 1268).
56 [2007] 1 WLR 1567 at 1571.
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provide a hypothetical situation in which a defendant deceives his
victim about his HIV status, and they assert that if V gives her agreement
in ignorance of a key fact, and if D knows of that ignorance and takes
advantage of it, it may be concluded that V did not agree by choice.57 EB
clearly ignores this possibility, but a very clear line of distinction can be
drawn between Herring’s ‘mistaken sex’ principle and an instance in
which a person is deceived about contracting HIV: the former relates to
a basic fact changing the purpose of the intercourse under s. 76 (which
has been argued to be implausible), but the latter really does change the
nature of the intercourse, also under s. 76.58
The ‘line of consent’ drawn in Brown is still good law, and it is applied
not only to homosexual activities, but to all non-fatal offences against
the person. No tangible rationale was given in either Dica59 or Konzani60
as to why individuals can consent to contracting a potentially fatal virus
under s. 20, but cannot consent to trivial harm under s. 47. Could it be
that the courts did not want to get involved in the personal lives of
consenting couples?61 This is not believable considering the level of risk
in Dica and Konzani. Was autonomy another reason considered by Judge
LJ? He considered public autonomy a parliamentary matter in Dica and
commented in Konzani that ‘the public interest also requires that the
principle of personal autonomy in the context of adult non-violent
sexual relationships should be maintained’.62 Should individuals exer-
cise their voluntary choice to contract a disease? Let us say that X and Y
are in a long-term relationship, but X contracts HIV through a blood
transfusion. X and Y still wish to marry and spend their lives together, so
Y agrees to have unprotected sex with X in the hope that she will one
day conceive and give birth to a healthy baby. Because the transmission
of the HIV virus is a s. 20 offence, according to Brown Y cannot consent,
but applying Dica and Konzani, if Y is fully aware of the risk, her consent
is a defence as long as it is ‘informed’. To limit the risk to the general
public, perhaps the law on the transmission of HIV should revert back to
Brown allowing only married couples to consent to such a risk. Or,
perhaps, the context of the harm and the attitudes of the parties could be
considered when determining whether the transmission of infection
counts as an exception to the general rule. For example, if V, who is in
a long-term relationship, finds out that she is terminally ill she may wish
to consummate her relationship with her HIV+ partner knowing that
she is unlikely to experience the slow effects of the virus. This behaviour
does not seem as reckless as that in Dica or Konzani.
It seems strange that the law can articulate when a person cannot
consent to certain behaviour (such as fighting outside public houses),
57 J. Temkin and A. Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual
Assaults and the Problems of Consent’ [2004] Crim LR 328 at 345.
58 See further J. Elvin, ‘The Concept of Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003’
(2008) 72 JCL 519.
59 [2004] QB 1257.
60 [2005] 2 Cr App R 14.
61 As was the case in R v Wilson [1996] 2 Cr App R 241.
62 See R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 at 1271 and R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at
208.
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but can consent to other serious harms. Ormerod believes that we are
left with three possible answers to the question ‘when does an act done
to P with P’s consent amount to an assault?’ which are: (1) when injury
is caused: Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980); (2) when injury is
likely to be caused (R v Boyea below); and (3) when D is aware that
injury might be caused and takes the unjustifiable risk of causing it.63
These varied options have been questioned by several writers.64 Even if
the resulting harm was unforeseen, this does little to exonerate the
defendant. In R v Boyea65 the defendant did not intend to harm his victim
when they engaged in dangerous sexual activities, but because harm
had been ‘intended or caused’—as per Lord Lane CJ in Attorney-General’s
Reference (No. 6 of 1980)—the victim’s consent was completely irrelev-
ant.66 It is submitted that if transmission of an infection occurs accident-
ally, unforeseeably, and with full consent to the act of intercourse, it may
be unfair to place culpability on either party.
As the law currently stands, any participant can consent to contract-
ing HIV. This suggests that the defendant must know of his HIV status,
but some sufferers may either be afraid to get tested or act completely
recklessly. Does the defendant’s knowledge make a difference to the
victim’s consent? The distinction between which information is relevant
for a valid and informed consent and which is not remains unclear after
Konzani.67
The defendant’s state of mind
A defendant’s deceptive state of mind has been a controversial issue
recently in relation to rape. The most innovative suggestion, by Herring,
is that intercourse under false pretences is intercourse for a different
purpose than that consented to, thus invalidating consent.68 Although it
has been contended that a rape conviction should not result simply
because the victim was mistaken as to a simple fact, or to protect people
against the disappointments and humiliations of their bad judgement,69
the issue of deception will remain relevant as long as the laws of sexual
offences in the UK are worded around the issue of informed consent
63 See D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn (Butterworths: London,
2002) 532–3.
64 See, particularly, J. R. Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection—Part 2’ (2004) 154
NLJ 448 at 451 and A. Reed and B. Fitzpatrick, Criminal Law, 3rd edn (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 2006) 395, who agree that the defendant must at least be
aware of the facts which make consent irrelevant before liability ensues. This is
supported by R v Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 570, where it was rejected by Judge J
that a defendant can be guilty when mens rea is absent.
65 (1992) 156 JP 505.
66 Ibid. at 513, per Glidewell LJ, following R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498.
Additionally, Boyea did not need to foresee the injuries of his indecent assault
because R v Savage and Parmenter [1992] 94 Cr App R 193 established that no mens
rea is required for the resulting bodily harm (ibid. at 207, per Lord Ackner).
67 See further discussion by Elliott and De Than, above n. 8 at 244.
68 See Herring, above n. 9 at 517; Gross, above n. 10; and Bohlander, above n. 7.
69 Gross, above n. 10 at 224–5.
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rather than the use of force.70 Although it is not currently deemed
reasonable to implement Herring’s theory of ‘mistaken sex’ in relation to
rape, if a victim is mistaken that her sexual partner is HIV negative when
he is in fact HIV positive, and he intentionally deceives her about this
fact, he is open to being convicted of malicious wounding.71 It can be
argued that in all instances where a defendant hides his HIV status, he is
being deceptive, but the recent changes in the law have not placed any
such responsibility on the shoulders of the defendant to inform his
victim of this fact. How can the defendant harbour an honest belief in
the victim’s consent if he himself has not divulged his HIV status? The
main issue now is: in what ways can a victim be informed, how in-
formed does she have to be, and who can be the informant?
It has been suggested by Bronitt that an individual can be aware of a
risk of infecting another without having actual knowledge of his or her
own infection.72 This may not be logical: to be ‘aware’ of a risk implies
knowledge that one poses a risk. The work of Spencer73 was referred to
in Dica, who argues that liability materialises if a defendant knows he
has or may have a grave disease and that his behaviour involves a risk of
transmission.74 Presently, the judgment of Dica requires the defendant to
know he has HIV,75 and the consensus is that this is the correct ap-
proach.76 Weait concludes that the only way to escape liability post-Dica
is to (a) disclose infection; or (b) never get tested.77 This is called into
question by Konzani.78 Judge LJ has claimed that the ultimate question
is not knowledge but consent, but he has also submitted that it is
unlikely that one would consent to a risk if one were ignorant of it.79
This is confusing. Does the victim require knowledge, and if so, to what
extent?
The victim’s state of mind
Many writers agree with Judge LJ in Dica that consent is not an issue in
HIV transmission cases, the result being rape if it was.80 However,
70 Bohlander, above n. 7 at 416 claims: ‘Rape traditionally . . . involves the fact that
the woman has to endure intercourse against her will because she is forced,
threatened or finds herself in an exploitative situation which leaves her no choice’
(emphasis in original).
71 This is because the victim must give an informed consent, and the defendant must
have an honest belief in that consent: R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at
208–9, per Judge LJ.
72 S. Bronitt, ‘Spreading Disease and the Criminal Law’ [1994] Crim LR 21 at 30.
73 J. R. Spencer, ‘Retrial for Reckless Infection’ (2004) 154 NLJ 762 at 767.
74 See J. R. Spencer, above n. 64 at 471. In addition, see J. R. Spencer, ‘Liability for
Reckless Infection: Part 1’ (2004) 154 NLJ 384; and ‘Reckless Infection in the
Court of Appeal: R v Dica’ (2004) 154 NLJ 762. Is a defendant who believes he may
have a grave disease merely morally rather than legally responsible to protect his
partner from infection?
75 [2004] QB 1257 at 1273, per Judge LJ.
76 See Weait, above n. 50 at 131; S. Ryan, ‘Reckless Transmission of HIV: Knowledge
and Culpability’ [2006] Crim LR 981 at 981.
77 See Weait, above n. 50 at 130–1.
78 [2005] 2 Cr App R 198.
79 Ibid. at 208–9 and see also R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 at 1273.
80 Would a new HIV offence correct this? See particularly Warburton, above n. 55 at
66 and Weait, above n. 50 at 127.
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disagreement has arisen regarding knowledge. Recent debates with
regard to informed consent under s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003
have suggested instances where a defendant may face some kind of
criminal reprimand for lying to his or her partner, particularly in relation
to what the intercourse stood for. Herring argues that in order for a
decision to carry the weight we expect of autonomy, we need to ensure
that the decision-maker is aware of the key facts involved in making the
decision.81 It is an interesting idea that consent can be vitiated if the
victim—if he or she had known the truth—would not have consented.
Bohlander warns that Herring has gone too far, arguing that the harm
that is being done to the victim by the defendant at the moment of
intercourse is that she is being duped, not that she is being penetrated.
The harm is thus psychological, not physical.82 This is not the case in HIV
transmission cases, however, where the defendant has been deceptive as
to his HIV status resulting in harm to the victim. Of course, Gross’s
argument that the act of sex is still consented to regardless of any trivial
mistakes made by the victim is just as relevant in HIV transmission cases
as it is in rape cases—the act of intercourse itself remains unaffected
despite a disease being passed. Lord Latham LJ in R v EB is correct when
he states that a victim is not consenting to the disease, but she is still
consenting to the intercourse: ‘as a matter of law, the fact that the
defendant may not have disclosed his HIV status is not a matter which
could in any way be relevant to the issue of consent under section 74 . . .
such consent did not include consent to infection by the disease’.83 The
issue now is to decipher what exactly the victim must know in order to
provide a properly informed consent, and whether any element of
deceptiveness on the part of the defendant plays a part in vitiating the
consent.
Spencer states that consent to a risk of infection must presuppose full
knowledge of the facts—suspecting is not enough.84 This seems reason-
able, but it would shift the evidential burden onto the victim. Can a
victim provide an informed consent if her knowledge is sourced from a
place other than the defendant? If ‘yes’, this would render the defend-
ant’s knowledge of his own HIV status irrelevant, leading to the danger-
ous assumption that the assailant need not divulge his status at all. The
ratio of Dica was read in R v Barnes85 to mean that a defendant who
discloses his condition will have a defence if ‘despite this knowledge
they were still prepared to accept the risks involved and consented to
having sexual intercourse with him’.86 Coupled with Judge LJ’s clear
directions in Konzani87 that an informed consent by the victim and an
honest belief in that consent from the defendant is analogous to the
81 Herring, above n. 9 at 516.
82 Bohlander, above n. 7.
83 [2007] 1 WLR 1567 at 1571; Gross, above n. 10.
84 See Spencer, above n. 73 at 767.
85 [2005] 1 WLR 910.
86 Ibid. at 913, judgment of the court read by Lord Woolf CJ, emphasis added.
87 [2005] 2 Cr App R 198.
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defendant’s revelation of his status,88 it appears initially that the defen-
dant must be honest and open in order to accept consent. However, a
loophole has appeared. Judge LJ recognised that in some instances an
informed consent can be given notwithstanding the defendant’s con-
cealment, and this would remain a defence:
By way of example, an individual with HIV may develop a sexual relation-
ship with someone who knew him while he was in hospital, receiving
treatment for the condition. If so, her informed consent would remain a
defence, even if the defendant had not personally informed her of his
condition. Alternatively, he may honestly believe that his new sexual partner was
told of his condition by someone known to them both. No doubt [these cases] will
be explored with the complainant in cross-examination. Her answers may
demonstrate an informed consent.89
By suggesting that social interactions can produce an informed consent,
Judge LJ has rejected the stipulation that the defendant must reveal his
condition to hold an honest belief in the consent. This allows a defend-
ant to be completely reckless, and places a significant burden on the
victim to look into the sexual history of his or her partner before
consenting. Additionally, Judge LJ believes that a victim’s implied con-
sent may only be obvious when cross-examined. How is a defendant to
confirm such an illusive informed consent at the time of the act itself? It
is foreseen that this loophole will be employed by numerous assailants.
Whilst it is completely feasible that a victim could provide an informed
consent to the risk of HIV without the defendant disclosing this informa-
tion, should some responsibility not be imposed upon the defendant?
Let us imagine that when X received his contaminated blood transfu-
sion, X’s doctor took Y to one side and told Y that her partner was HIV
positive, but X does not disclose his condition directly to Y. According to
one reading of Konzani, X’s honest belief in Y’s consent is still missing
because it was not X who disclosed the information. According to
another reading of Konzani, Y’s informed consent will suffice as a de-
fence. Is it possible that Judge LJ meant that a victim can derive his or
her knowledge from any source, but the defendant must be informed—
by the victim—that this knowledge exists? Should X check with Y that
she is aware of his condition? It may be more logical to keep the burden
on the defendant to check that the victim is aware of the situation.
As a result of both Dica and Konzani, it seems as though a person can
consent to the transmission of HIV under s. 20 if those risks have been
directly or indirectly disclosed to him or her by any source. Realistically,
full knowledge is difficult to attain. If V’s partner is not willing to divulge
the true nature of his sexual health, does V have any other choice than
to take a risk? Alternatively, can wilful blindness on the part of the
victim suffice as knowledge? Devlin J was clearly of the view in R v
Roper90 that a wilful refusal to make inquiries was equivalent to knowl-
edge.91 With respect to Devlin J, the refusal to make inquiries is difficult
88 Ibid. at 208.
89 Ibid. at 209, emphasis added.
90 Taylor’s Central Garages v Roper [1995] 2 TLR 284.
91 Ibid. at 288–9.
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to equate with the actual knowledge derived from making such in-
quiries. What is slightly worrying is the seemingly low threshold to
establish the defence of consent in HIV transmission cases. The defend-
ant is not to be convicted if there was or may have been an informed
consent by his sexual partner to the risk.92 How may a victim be in-
formed of a risk? Does a hint suffice? A ‘secret understanding’?
It is submitted that Konzani has opened the defence of consent far too
wide in relation to HIV transmission cases. A defendant has plenty of
freedom to manoeuvre, while the victim has very little.
A way forward for reckless HIV transmission
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was not designed to dis-
courage the spread of infectious diseases. Interestingly, an offence of
administering a noxious substance under s. 23 has been suggested in
HIV transmission cases instead of s. 20, but sexual intercourse is unlikely
to be considered as ‘administering’.93 In its report Legislating the Criminal
Code: Offences against the Person and General Principles, the Law Commis-
sion expressed the view that intentional or reckless transmission of
disease should be capable of constituting an offence against the person.94
A second publication, Consent in the Criminal Law, made a provisional
proposal that precluded a defence of consent for the proposed offence of
recklessly causing seriously disabling injury.95 This approach was de-
scribed as ‘sensible’.96 In 1998, the Home Office issued a Consultation
Paper entitled Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861.97
In this paper, the government had not accepted the recommendation
that there should be offences to enable the intentional or reckless
transmission of disease to be prosecuted. The government was partic-
ularly concerned that the law would ‘discriminate against those who
were HIV positive, have AIDS or viral hepatitis or who carry any kind of
disease’.98 It then proposed that the criminal law should apply only to
those whom it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt had deliberately
transmitted a disease intending to cause serious injury.99 This suggestion
seems to sway more towards s. 18 convictions for intentional transmis-
sion of HIV, but since it is never certain that the virus will be transmitted
during intercourse, such behaviour could only ever be reckless.
92 R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 198 at 208, per Judge LJ, emphasis added.
93 See Bronitt, above n. 72 at 37.
94 Law Com. Report No. 218, Cm 2370 (1993), paras 15.15–15.17, available at http://
www.lawcom.gov.uk, accessed 12 April 2010.
95 Law Com. Consultation Paper No. 139 (1995), paras 4.46–4.51, available at http://
www.lawcom.gov.uk, accessed 12 April 2010.
96 See, particularly, Spencer, above n. 73 at 389.
97 Home Office, Consultation Paper (May 1998), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.
uk/documents/cons-1998-violence-reforming-law/?version=1www.homeoffice.gov.uk,
accessed 12 April 2010.
98 Ibid. at para. 3.16. This rejection may be misguided—only those who are
blameworthy should incur liability. For a supporting view, see Warburton, above
n. 55 at 69.
99 Home Office, Consultation Paper, above n. 94 at para. 3.18. See R v Dica [2004]
QB 1257 at 1271–2 for a detailed review of the reform history in this area.
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An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is the most logical
way forward to close the loophole raised in Konzani. It seems inap-
propriate that the law cannot protect unknowing victims against reck-
less individuals who can claim an honest belief in consent simply
because the victim may have been seen talking to an acquaintance
who knew of the defendant’s condition. Herring’s previously discussed
provision has caused controversy.100 The result of this test would be
rape, but when recklessly transmitting HIV, rape does not seem to be the
appropriate tag to attach to a defendant. In R v EB101 Latham LJ dis-
agreed that an HIV transmission case should be decided along these
lines. In this case, B transmitted HIV to an unknowing—but consent-
ing—acquaintance.102 Latham LJ correctly held that the act of inter-
course remains a consensual act.103 Many writers have argued that a
victim who consents to intercourse is not consenting to infected inter-
course, which is of a different quality, and thus a rape conviction should
logically result.104 The real issue in HIV transmission cases is not whether
the consent (to the sex or to the malicious wounding) was vitiated, but
whether the victim was properly informed as to the disease he or she
was about to contract. Even though Herring’s ‘mistaken sex’ theory is
deemed to be unworkable, it does place a responsibility upon the
defendant to be honest to his partner. In instances where this involves a
simple fact, this is not so urgent, but in cases involving HIV, this is vital.
Perhaps it may be best to avoid the already complex areas of consent and
mistake and keep things simple by amending the 2003 Act in order to
place the burden of proof on the defendant? The following provision is
suggested:
Transmitting HIV through sexual intercourse
3A. Any person who,
(a) knowing of their HIV positive status, or
(b) suspects that they hold such a status,
intentionally or recklessly engages in sexual intercourse with a second
person, failing to inform that second person of their knowledge or suspi-
cions of their HIV positive status, shall be guilty of an offence if that second
person contracts HIV.
The second party must consent to the transmission once the defendant
has performed his informative role. Of course, if the Sexual Offences Act
2003 was amended to cover HIV transmission through intercourse, that
100 See quote in text at n. 9 above; Herring, above n. 9 at 517.
101 [2007] 1 WLR 1567.
102 The trial judge directed the jury to consider whether the complainant had had the
freedom to consent to intercourse with a man whom she did not know was HIV
positive (ibid. at 1569).
103 Ibid. at 1571.
104 This is particularly in reference to the law of mistake and misrepresentation.
Under s. 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, if the defendant intentionally
deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act, it will be
conclusively presumed that the complainant did not consent to that act and the
defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to that act. In R v EB
[2007] 1 WLR 1567 it was ruled that these directions applied to acts of a sexual
nature, not the transfer of disease. See particularly Williams, above n. 55 at 132–3
and Herring, above n. 9.
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would mean that the definition of consent under s. 74 would become
directly relevant to HIV transmission, rather than using the rules of
consent under non-fatal offences.
In order to allow a ‘victim’ to make a free and informed consent to the
HIV offence under the new s. 3A, her knowledge must not be allowed to
be derived from another source other than the defendant. Perhaps s. 74
could be amended to read as follows:
A person consents if he or she agrees by choice, and has the freedom and
capacity to make that choice, from all the relevant information divulged by
the accused.
Whilst maintaining the positions of Dica and Konzani, these provisions
place responsibility back onto the defendant.
Conclusion
It has been decided that for an individual to consent to contracting HIV
through sexual intercourse, his or her consent must be informed and the
accused must have an honest belief in such consent. However, it has
been shown that as a result of Konzani: (1) the victim’s knowledge may
be derived from several sources, allowing the defendant to claim an
honest belief despite hiding his HIV status, and (2) the victim’s informed
consent may only come through in cross-examination, making it diffi-
cult for the defendant to be aware of the informed consent at the time of
the intercourse. These oversights greatly reduce the defendant’s burden
of responsibility. Without a clear statutory offence, these ‘get-out
clauses’ leave the door open for reckless individuals simply to ‘assume’
informed consent before embarking on infected intercourse. A new
offence of transmitting HIV through sexual intercourse has been sug-
gested to overcome the loophole in Konzani and Dica by allowing for a
conviction where a person knows or may know he has the HIV virus and
fails to tell his sexual partner. This element of disclosure is also an
integral part of the defence of consent in an amended version of s. 74 of
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ensuring that the new offence places the
burden of proof to disclose HIV status firmly back onto the defendant.
It remains unclear why an individual can consent to contracting a
grave disease under s. 20 yet may not consent to minor harm under s. 47
of the 1861 Act. Whilst Dica endeavours to support the issue of auto-
nomy by establishing that an individual can knowingly consent to the
s. 20 offence of HIV transmission, several questions are raised on public
policy. Why has Dica crossed the line of consent? Judge LJ distinguished
Dica from Brown on the basis of violence and degradation,105 but apart
from the defendants’ characteristics, i.e. homosexuality, the issues at
hand are not that different. Whilst it may be true that sado-masochistic
activities are more violent than ‘conventional’ sexual intercourse, was
not the decision in Brown based on public policy and the spread of
105 [2004] QB 1257 at 1270: ‘[Brown was] concerned with violent crime, and the
sexual overtones did not alter the fact that both parties [in Brown were]
consenting to the deliberate infliction of serious harm or bodily injury on one
participant by the other’.
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disease and infection?106 Surely an offence under s. 20 is more danger-
ous than s. 47 regardless of the context of the harms? Ormerod submits
that the policy in Brown was to convict men participating in consensual
sado-maschistic homosexual encounters resulting in actual bodily harm
to protect society against a cult of violence with the danger of corruption
of young men and the potential for the infliction of serious injury.107
Even though the true rationale underlying Brown is unclear, it is highly
unlikely that the activities in Brown were prohibited because of the
sexuality of the defendants. It is more likely that the activities in Brown
were prohibited because they were dangerous. Is not the spread of a
potentially fatal virus dangerous? It is submitted that the trial judge in
Dica was right to apply Brown, as it is not in the public’s best interests to
risk spreading a dangerous virus ‘for no good reason’.108 Perhaps the
discussions in Brown should have been directed towards regulating the
dangerous sexual behaviour under new guidelines as opposed to why
they were already unlawful. An alternative argument bravely raised by
Lord Mustill in Brown discussed a potential new offence under the 1861
Act in order to protect those who engaged in dangerous sexual activ-
ities.109 Considerations for this new offence included the increasing
spread of infections, matters getting out of hand between couples and
groups who engage in such dangerous sexual activities, the spread of
HIV as a public health matter, and the protection of young people who
are easily influenced. Unfortunately, balancing personal rights against
taking risks was considered to be a parliamentary matter and Lord
Mustill was met with considerable dissent.110 ‘Public policy’ has been
applied selectively depending on the nature of the act and the character-
istics of the defendants. Lord Mustill’s radical suggestion in Brown to
regulate harmful sexual activities as opposed to precluding them com-
pletely from a defence of consent was a liberal idea, one which may well
have given more consideration to public policy than the actual outcome
of Brown which was to remove the right to consent to harmful sexual
activities completely. A new offence of HIV transmission within the
ambit of sexual offences would provide a specific offence with its own
rules on consent, thus leaving the line of consensual activity as drawn in
Brown restricted to the field of non-fatal non-sexual offences.
106 In R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 14, Judge LJ stated ‘in the public interest, so far
as possible, the spread of catastrophic illness must be avoided or prevented’.
107 See generally Ormerod, above n. 63 at 536.
108 Approving the rationale of Lord Lane CJ in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of
1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057 at 1059–60. See further Davies, above n. 43 at 499, on
why the trial judge in Brown was correct.
109 [1994] 1 AC 212 at 274–5. Lord Mustill rejected illegalising the acts on
repugnance alone, and sought to list proper reasons why the acts should be made
criminal.
110 [1994] 1 AC 212 at 235–7, 245–6 and 276, Lord Templeman, Lord Jauncey and
Lord Slynn dissenting. An appeal by Brown to the European Court of Human
Rights was unsuccessful because it is the right of the State to regulate acts of
torture: see Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 39 at
paras 39 and 43.
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